PACE (DO NOT DELETE)

9/5/2022 8:40 AM

CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE OF ALCOHOL AND
MARIJUANA REGULATION IN A FEDERALIST SYSTEM

H. Justin Pace*
INTRODUCTION ...................................................... 623
DIVERGENCE AND CONVERGENCE IN STATE LAW
................................................................................... 626
A. Divergence: State Alcohol Regulation in the U.S.
Post-Prohibition .................................................. 630
B. Convergence: State Marijuana Regulation in the
U.S. in the 21st Century...................................... 635
C. Divergence: Province Marijuana Regulation in
Canada Post-Prohibition ..................................... 642
III. AN INTEREST GROUP, PATH DEPENDENCY, AND
TEMPORAL THEORY OF CONVERGENCE ......... 648
IV. CONCLUSION ........................................................... 659
I.
II.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Marijuana prohibition in the United States (“U.S.”) is on the
wane. Eighteen U.S. states and the District of Columbia have
“legalized” adult-use (also known as “recreational”) marijuana
(also known as “cannabis”) possession and use under state law as
of the beginning of 2022. 1 This is an increase of three states in just
two years. 2 Early legalization efforts succeeded through popular
referendums, but over the past few years, reform efforts have
succeeded through state legislation as well. 3 Medical marijuana is
* Assistant Professor of Business Law, Western Carolina University, College of
Business. The author wishes to extend sincere thanks for helpful comments by
participants at the Seton Hall Legislative Journal Symposium Conversations on
Cannabis.
1
Cannabis Overview, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGS. (July 6, 2021),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/marijuana-overview.aspx.
2
See H. Justin Pace, The “Free Market” for Marijuana: A Sober, Clear-Eyed
Analysis of Marijuana Policy, 24 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1219, 1220 (2020)
[hereinafter, Pace, Free Market] (citing Cannabis Overview, supra note 1).
3 See Pace, Free Market, supra note 2, at 1254 (noting that Illinois was “the first
state to provide for legalization and regulation of adult use marijuana sales
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even more popular; a total of thirty-seven states have legalized it. 4
Marijuana remains illegal under U.S. federal law, 5 however, and
only limited congressional or regulatory movement has been made
on reform at the federal level. 6 As state legalization efforts
continue and accelerate, state-level marijuana regulation is
showing signs of convergence.7
The U.S. experimented with federal alcohol prohibition as
well during a period bookended by the Eighteenth and Twentyfirst Amendments. 8 The Twenty-first Amendment did not create
a federal regulatory scheme for alcohol or even empower Congress
to create one; rather, it left the matter to the states. 9 It even
buttressed state law by prohibiting the “transportation or
importation” of alcohol into a state “in violation of” that state’s
laws. 10 States did not respond uniformly to the Twenty-first
Amendment. Individual states continued to prohibit alcohol or
allow subsidiary government units to prohibit alcohol. Certain
common elements like the three-tier system predominated, but
state alcohol regulation also showed substantial divergence. 11 That
divergence has persisted. 12

legislatively”). In the scant few years since the Illinois legislature legalized marijuana,
state legislatures in Connecticut, Virginia, New York, and New Mexico have legalized
marijuana via statute. Cannabis Overview, supra note 1.
4
State Medical Cannabis Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGS. (Feb. 3, 2021),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx.
5 21 U.S.C. § 812 Schedule I(c)(10).
6 Pace, Free Market, supra note 2, at 1222–24.
7
Pace, Free Market, supra note 2, at 1255–56; see also Martin Gelter,

Accounting and Convergence in Corporate Governance: Doctrinal or Economic Path
Dependence?, in RSCH. HANDBOOK ON COMPAR. CORP. GOVERNANCE 282, 284 (Afra

Afsharipour & Martin Gelter, eds. 2021) (“‘Convergence’ in corporate governance
refers to the idea that corporate and securities laws across countries are evolving
toward a single model.”). The concept of convergence can be extended beyond the
corporate governance context.
8 U.S. CONST. amends. XVIII, XXI.
9 Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 110 (1980)
(stating that the Twenty-first Amendment “grants the States virtually complete
control over whether to permit importation or sale of [alcohol] and how to structure
the [alcohol] distribution system”).
10 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
11 Supra Part IIa.
12 Supra Part IIa.
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Canada ended the prohibition of marijuana nationwide in
2018 with the Cannabis Act. 13 The Cannabis Act set up a basic
federal framework to regulate marijuana, but it left designing and
implementing the bulk of the new marijuana regulatory
framework to the provinces (the sub-federal government units in
Canada analogous to U.S. states). 14 The end of Canadian
marijuana prohibition, then, looks more like the abrupt end of
U.S. alcohol prohibition than the slow wane in U.S. marijuana
prohibition. Prohibition ended all at once, with the details left to
each sub-national unit, rather than gradually, on a sub-national
unit by sub-national unit basis.15 It should come as no surprise
then that Canadian marijuana regulation displays the divergence
present in U.S. alcohol regulation rather than the convergence
present in U.S. marijuana regulation. 16
Legal scholarship on marijuana regulation is still in its
adolescence, with the bulk of legal scholarship on marijuana
reaching publication only over the last few years, a rapid growth in
legal scholarship on marijuana, and a great deal of scholarly
territory still to be trod. Scholars have frequently looked to alcohol
regulation in analyzing marijuana policy, but no known paper
considers U.S. alcohol regulation, U.S. marijuana regulation, and
Canadian marijuana regulation together. State comparative law
remains undertheorized. “Convergence” and “divergence” have
been identified and addressed in the state constitutional law
literature but have received scant attention otherwise. 17 This paper
Cannabis Act, S.C. 2018, c. 16 (Can.).
See Alice de Koning & John F. McArdle, Implementing Regulation in an
Emerging Industry, 55 J. OF CAN. STUD. 362, 364 (2021) (“Effectively, Canada
simultaneously created 13 distinct emerging economies within a mature economic
framework. Each of those 13 distinct economic models approached opening their
markets somewhat differently, but all of them did so at the same time.”).
15 Supra Part IIa.
16 Supra Part IIc.
17
See, e.g., Scott R. Bauries, State Constitutions and Individual Rights:
Conceptual Convergence in School Finance Litigation, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 301,
302 (2011)
Scholars of state constitutional law have identified two distinct
approaches to federal adjudicatory doctrines in construing rights
guarantees stemming from constitutional language similar to that
found in the federal document. State courts may adopt federal
doctrine in whole or in part—what is sometimes referred to as
“convergence”—or they may choose to craft their own doctrine—
13
14
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contributes to the literature by analyzing new developments in
alcohol and marijuana regulation; considering U.S. state-level
alcohol regulation, U.S. state-level marijuana regulation, and
Canadian province-level marijuana regulation together; and by
developing a theory of why state law sometimes converges and
sometimes diverges.
Part II of this paper tracks the history of alcohol reform in the
United States and marijuana reform in the U.S. and Canada, with
an emphasis on the way that alcohol regulation and marijuana
regulation in Canada have shown divergence, while marijuana
regulation in the U.S. has shown convergence. Part III proposes a
theory as to why this divergence and convergence occurred. In
addition to interest group politics and path dependence, this
distinction is driven by a temporal effect. Multiple sub-national
units making regulations at the same time will result in divergence;
sub-national units reforming one by one will result in convergence
as reformers and interest groups learn from the processes. Part IV
concludes.
II.

DIVERGENCE AND CONVERGENCE IN STATE LAW

The U.S. and Canada are both federalist nations, meaning the
governments in both countries consist of a central, national
government as well as regional, sub-national governments, each
with the power to act independently. 18 Federalism is advantageous
to a heterogenous society because it facilitates pluralism: subnational units can adopt policies that suit a population that might
differ quite a bit in relevant ways from the population of another
sub-national unit. 19 Sub-national units can “serve as a laboratory;
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the
what has been referred to as “divergence.”
(citations omitted).
18 Sujit Choudhry & Nathan Hume, Federalism, Devolution and Secession: From
Classical to Post-Conflict Federalism, in RSCH. HANDBOOK ON COMPAR. CONST. L.
356, 357 (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2013) (citing K.C. WHEARE, FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT, 4–5 (1964)).
19
Choudhry & Hume, supra note 18, at 360 (“Federalism allows groups that
have a history of self-government or a distinct culture or economy to preserve some
measure of autonomy. By definition, it offers the benefits of unity without the costs
of imposing uniformity on a diverse population.”) (citing WHEARE, supra note 18;
RONALD L. WATTS, NEW FEDERATIONS: EXPERIMENTS IN THE COMMONWEALTH (1966)).
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rest of the country.” 20
States can learn from marijuana reform pioneers like
Colorado, which may lead them to push reform, fight against it, or
change how they design their own marijuana regulations.
However, Federalism brings disadvantages as well. Changes to the
law in one sub-national unit can spill over into another. Nebraska
and Oklahoma, for example, sued Colorado arguing that by
legalizing marijuana, Colorado “‘increased trafficking and
transportation of Colorado-sourced marijuana’ into their
territories, requiring them to expend significant ‘law enforcement,
judicial system, and penal system resources’ to combat the
increased trafficking and transportation of marijuana.” 21
The tendency of law in sub-national units to converge at
times 22 and diverge at times 23 is under-theorized. Alcohol and
marijuana reform in the United States and Canada offer a
compelling case study of why and how reform in a similar direction
in a similar area (vice legalization and regulation) can lead to
convergence of law under one set of circumstances and divergence
under another set of circumstances. Alcohol and marijuana
regulation is not an unimportant, esoteric area of the law. The
(quasi-legal) U.S. marijuana industry is much smaller than the
alcohol industry—with $17.5 billion in sales in 2020 dwarfed by

New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
21
Neb. v. Colo., 577 U.S. 1211, 1214 (2016) (quoting Compl. ¶ 58; Br. In
Support of Mot. For Leave to File Compl. 11–16).
22 See, e.g., Gelter, supra note 7, at 2
Convergence in corporate governance has been debated for the
past 20 years, particularly in the legal and the law and economics
literature. Broadly speaking, proponents argue that laws and
practices in corporate governance have been converging to a single
standard that emphasizes the interests of shareholders, including
outside investors (as opposed to prioritizing, for example,
employees, other stakeholders, controlling shareholders, or the
‘public interest.’;
Bauries, supra note 17, at 322, 352 (identifying both doctrinal and conceptual
convergence in state court interpretation of state constitutional provisions
concerning school finance).
23 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in
Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 129 (1999) (arguing
that convergence among countries in corporate governance has been prevented by
path dependence).
20
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$253.8 billion in alcohol sales in 2018. 24 But, the market for legal
marijuana in the U.S. is growing rapidly. It generated only $2.7
billion in sales in 2014, just a couple of years after the first states
legalized adult-use marijuana and before the surge in legalization
between 2018 and 2021. 25
The “breweries, wineries, and distilleries” category produced
the second largest gain in U.S. manufacturing jobs in 2018, and
the sector has been adding jobs at a much higher rate than the
economy overall. 26 Marijuana jobs have been growing even more
rapidly, with, for example, forty-four percent more jobs added in
2018 relative to 2017, making it the “fastest growing labor market
in the U.S.” 27 Adult-use marijuana sales generated $10.4 billion in
tax revenue from 2014 to 2021 (none of which went to the federal
government, of course). 28 Marijuana tax revenue is dwarfed by
alcohol tax revenue, with just the federal government collecting
$10 billion in alcohol tax revenue in 2019 alone. 29

24 Sharon Lam, Canada’s Weed Lead is Running Out of Puff, REUTERS (Dec. 21,
2021, 9:59 AM), https://www.reuters.com/breakingviews/canadas-weed-lead-isrunning-out-puff-2021-12-21/; Seren Morris, US Alcohol Sales Increased by 5.1% in
2018, DRINKS BUS. (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.thedrinksbusiness.com/2019/01/usalcohol-sales-increased-by-5-1-in-2018; see also John T. Holden & Marc Edelman,

Regulating Vice: What the U.S. Marijuana Industry Can Learn From State
Governance of Sports Gambling, U. OF ILL. L. REV. 1051, 1083 (2021) (noting that

“the market for the illegal purchase of marijuana in the United States is approaching
$50 billion per year”) (relying on Will Yakowicz, Illegal Pot Sales Topped $46.4
Billion in 2016, and That’s Good News for Marijuana Entrepreneurs, INC. (Jan. 17,
2017), https://www.inc.com/will-yakowicz/marijuana-sales-2016-50-billion.html)).
25
Pace, Free Market, supra note 2, at 1257 (citing Luke Scheuer, Are “Legal”
Marijuana Contracts “Illegal”?, 16 U.C. Davis Bus. L. J. 31, 42 (2015)).
26
Justin Fox, In the Future, There Will Be a Distillery on Every Corner,
BLOOMBERG
(Mar.
16,
2018,
10:00
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-03-16/americans-aren-t-lettinggo-of-their-craft-beer-wine-and-whisky.
27
Jeff Cox, The Marijuana Industry Looks Like the Fastest-Growing Labor
Market in the Country, CNBC (Mar. 14, 2019, 1:48 PM), https//www.cnbc.com/
2019/03/14/the-marijuana-industry-looks-like-the-fastest-growing-job-market-inthe-country.html.
28
Tiffany Kary, Almost Half of New York Towns Opt Out of Pot, For Now,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 10, 2022, 7:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/
2022-01-10/marijuana-sales-in-new-york-must-overcome-local-resistance.
29 Tax Policy Center Briefing Book: Key Elements of the U.S. Tax System, TAX
POL’Y CTR., https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-are-major-federalexcise-taxes-and-how-much-money-do-they-raise (last accessed May 25, 2022).
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The economic activity, though, is balanced by substantial
costs. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”)
estimates that excessive consumption of alcohol cost the U.S. a
quarter-trillion dollars in 2010. 30 Alcohol played “a significant role
in” “a sharp and country-specific increase in mortality among
white, non-Hispanic, middle-aged men and women.” 31 Of the two,
alcohol is not only more dangerous than marijuana, it “carries a
much higher addiction risk.” 32 But marijuana is not without its
risks. Those risks include psychosis, susceptibility to false
memories, lower birth weight, cardiovascular risks, and a higher
risk of depression.33 More specific to reform efforts, drivers testing
positive for marijuana after auto accidents and “[c]alls to poison
control after accidental ingestion of marijuana edibles by children”
have increased after legalization. 34
Compounding matters,
“marijuana may be a complementary good for alcohol.” 35 Alcohol
and, to a lesser extent, marijuana use is common in the U.S. Over
30
Data on Excessive Drinking, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/alcohol/data-stats.htm (last reviewed Apr. 12, 2022).
31 Pace, Free Market, supra note 2, at 1262, 1264 (relying on ANNE CASE & ANGUS
DEATON, DEATHS OF DESPAIR AND THE FUTURE OF CAPITALISM 3–9 (2020); Anne Case
& Angus Deaton, Rising Morbidity and Mortality in Midlife Among White NonHispanic Americans in the 21st Century, 112 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 15078,
15078–79 (2015)).
32 Pace, Free Market, supra note 2, at 1264 (relying on Dirk W. Lachenmeier &
Jürgen Rehm, Comparative Risk Assessment of Alcohol, Tobacco, Cannabis and
Other Illicit Drugs Using the Margin of Exposure Approach, 5 SCI. REP. 1, 2 (2015);
Aubree L. Walton et al., The Potential Health Risks and Legal Implications of
Cannabis, at *19 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)).
33
Pace, Free Market, supra note 2, at 1260 (relying on Lilian Kloft et al.,
Cannabis Increases Susceptibility to False Memory, 117 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 4585,
4588 (Feb. 10, 2020), https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1920162117; Robin M. Murray
et al., Traditional Marijuana, High-Potency Cannabis and Synthetic Cannabinoids:
Increasing Risk for Psychosis, 15 WORLD PSYCHIATRY 195, 195 (2016); Walton et al.,
supra note 32, at *12–13).
34 Pace, Free Market, supra note 2, at 1260 (relying on Stacy Salomonsen-Sautel
et al., Trends in Fatal Motor Vehicle Crashes Before and After Marijuana
Commercialization in Colorado, 140 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 137, 140 (2014);
Walton et al., supra note 32, at *21–22); but see generally Pace, Free Market, supra
note 2, at 1259–68 (analyzing externalities—positive and negative—related to
marijuana legalization, including early empirical evidence that marijuana may be a
substitute good for opioids and thus reduce opioid overdose deaths).
35
Pace, Free Market, supra note 2, at 1264 (relying on Philip Wallach &
Jonathan Rauch, Bootleggers, Baptists, Bureaucrats, and Bongs: How Special
Interests Will Shape Marijuana Legalization, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE PUB. MGMT. AT
BROOKINGS 8 (2016)).
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half of Americans over the age of eleven reported using alcohol in
the past month; over fifteen percent of the same population
reported using marijuana. 36
A. Divergence: State Alcohol Regulation in the U.S. Post-

Prohibition

A widespread and sustained temperance movement in the
U.S. culminated in replacing a “largely unregulated” alcohol
industry with capital-P Prohibition.38 The Eighteenth Amendment
prohibited the importation, “manufacture, sale, or transportation”
(but not possession) of alcohol within the entire U.S.39 The
Eighteenth Amendment did not remotely eliminate alcohol
consumption in the U.S., 40 but it did come with negative spillover
effects.41 Although it led to some reduction in overall alcohol
37

36 Audrey Redford & Angela K. Dills, The Political Economy of Drug and Alcohol
Regulation During the COVID-19 Pandemic, 87 SOUTHERN ECON. J. 1175, 1175–76
(2021) (citing Key substance use and mental health indicators in the United States:
Results from the 2018 National Survey on Drug Use and Health, SUBSTANCE ABUSE

& MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., https://www.samhsa.gov/data/.).
37
See Harry G. Levine & Craig Reinarman, From Prohibition to Regulation:
Lessons from Alcohol Policy for Drug Policy, 69 MILBANK Q. 461, 462–63 (1991)
By the mid-1830s temperance had become a mass movement of
the middle class. . . . From roughly the 1850s on, many temperance
supporters endorsed the idea of prohibition. . . . In the twentieth
century a new prohibitionist organization—the Anti-Saloon
League—came to dominate the movement. . . . The League put
its considerable resources behind candidates of any party who
would vote as it directed on the single issue of liquor.
38 Jonathan R. Elsner, An Argument Against Regulating Cannabis Like Alcohol,
3 (Ohio St. Pub. L., Working Paper No. 482, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3395308.
39 U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII.
40
See, e.g., Levine & Reinarman, supra note 37, at 464 (“Prohibition was
massively and openly violated, and alcohol was readily available in most of the United
States.”); see also Drive-By Truckers, Where the Devil Don’t Stay, on THE DIRTY
SOUTH (New West Records 2004) (“Prohibition was the talk, but the rich folks walked
to the woods where my daddy stayed. Jugs and jars from shiners.”).
41
See, e.g., Levine & Reinarman, supra note 37 at 464–65, 471 (“Adulterated
and even poisonous alcohol was sold and many people were locked up for violating
prohibition laws. . . . [P]rohibition, many came to believe, undermined respect for all
law. . . . Prohibition, . . . produced far more substantial negative side effects than did
regulation.”).
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consumption,42 Prohibition was a failure and regarded as such. 43
Less than fifteen years after the Eighteenth Amendment was
ratified, the Twenty-first Amendment repealed Prohibition.44
The Supreme Court has inferred that the Twenty-first
Amendment “grants the States virtually complete control over
whether to permit importation or sale of [alcohol] and how to
structure the [alcohol] distribution system.” 45 States rushed to
regulate alcohol. 46
The Toward Liquor Control report,
commissioned by John Rockefeller, Jr., promoted two models of
alcohol regulation: (1) a private system featuring a three-tier
distribution scheme and (2) a public alcohol control system. 47 A
42
See Pamela E. Pennock & K. Austin Kerr, In the Shadow of Prohibition:
Domestic American Alcohol Policy since 1933, 47 BUS. HIS. 383, 385 (2005) (“In the

early years of prohibition, alcoholic beverage consumption declined dramatically,
with police, social workers, ministers and journalists reporting noticeable reductions
in the problems associated with alcohol abuse.”); but see Levine & Reinarman, supra
note 37, at 469 (noting that, after the first three years, alcohol consumption was
higher per capita during Prohibition than it had been during World War I, when
alcohol was highly taxed and production and sale restricted) (relying on CLARK
WARBURTON, THE ECONOMIC RESULTS OF PROHIBITION 260 (1932)).
43 See Levine & Reinarman, supra note 37, at 470 (“It is difficult to disagree with
Nadelmann’s conclusion that the ‘British experience [and, we would add, the
Australian experience] strongly indicates that the national prohibition of alcohol in
the United States was, on balance, not successful.’”) (quoting Ethan Nadelmann,
Response to Letters, 246 SC. 1102 (1989)); cf. DOUGLAS ADAMS, The Restaurant at
the End of the Universe, THE ULTIMATE HITCHHIKER’S GUIDE TO THE GALAXY 144,149
(Wings Books 1996) (“In the beginning the Universe was created. This has made a
lot of people very angry and been widely regarded as a bad move.”).
44 U.S. CONST. amends. XVIII, XXI.
45 Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 110 (1980).
The federal government mostly took a hands-off approach to alcohol regulation until
the 1980s, when it “set the drinking age nationally at 21, required a stricter threshold
for determining when a driver was drunk, and prescribed warnings about the dangers
of [fetal] alcohol syndrome and drunk driving.” Pennock & Kerr, supra note 42,
at 384. The ATF and the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Alcohol and Tobacco
Tax and Trade Bureau are the federal agencies primarily responsible for enforcing
federal alcohol regulation, focusing, for example, on the “traffic [of] illicit liquor . . .
in interstate commerce” and “[c]ollection of the Alcohol . . . Excise Taxes imposed
on manufactures [sic] and importers of these products.” The BUREAU OF ALCOHOL,
TOBACCO, FIREARMS, AND EXPLOSIVES (“ATF”), https://www.atf.gov/alcohol-tobacco
(last accessed May 25, 2022).
46 Jarrett Dieterle, Enjoy Prohibition Repeal Day, but These Crazy Alcohol Laws
Show We have a Long Way to Go, WASH. EXAM’R (Dec. 4, 2018, 12:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/enjoy-prohibition-repeal-day-butthese-crazy-alcohol-laws-show-we-have-a-long-way-to-go.
47 Elsner, supra note 38, at 3.
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majority of states adopted a three-tier distribution system.48 The
three-tier distribution system was a response to the perceived evils
of vertical integration pre-Prohibition. 49 As the name suggests, the
three-tier system mandates alcohol pass through three stages
before
landing
in
the
consumer’s
hands:
(1)
manufacturers/suppliers, (2) distributors/wholesalers, and (3)
retailers.50 Licenses for each stage are traditionally mutually
exclusive, 51 and manufacturers/suppliers, wholesalers/distributors,
and retailers are prohibited “from having any financial interest in
each other.” 52 The economics of the three-tier distribution system
favor large manufacturers and distributors/wholesalers.53
A minority of states adopted an alcohol control system.54 An
alcohol control system involves some level of state-owned or statesupported monopoly. Seventeen states mandate purchase from a
state-owned or state-protected wholesaler, and thirteen of those
states also monopolize retail sales through “government-operated
[liquor] stores or designated agents.” 55 For example, a consumer
in Michigan purchasing liquor for off-premises consumption can
buy from privately owned and operated retailers but must pay (at
least) a state minimum price consisting of the price charged by the

48
Elsner, supra note 38, at 4 (citing Birth of State Based, Three Tier Alcohol
Regulation, MONT. BEER & WINE DISTR. ASS’N, https://mbwda.org/birth-of-state-

based-three-tier-alcohol-regulation (last visited April 10, 2022)).
49 Elsner, supra note 38, at 3.
50
Jeffrey C. O’Brien, The Craft Brewing Boom and Minnesota’s Three-Tier
System: The Case for Change, 43 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 971, 973 (2017).
Manufacturers/suppliers include “brewers, vintners, and importers” and retailers
include “liquor stores, restaurants, etc.” O’Brien, supra note 50, at 975.
51 Elsner, supra note 38, at 4.
52 O’Brien, supra note 50, at 975.
53
See Elsner, supra note 38, at 3 (explaining the economics of how the threetier distribution system favor large manufacturers and distributors/wholesalers: “This
‘tied-house’ concept was prevalent up until Prohibition, when it was criticized as
being a corrupt system whereby brewers and distillers cared only about ‘increased
sales’ and ‘nothing about the community.’”); see also O’Brien, supra note 50, at 973
(explaining how the system gives large distributors/wholesalers a major incentive to
preserve the system and how franchise law further entrenches the system).
54
Elsner, supra note 38, at 4 (citing Birth of State Based, Three Tier Alcohol
Regulation, MONT. BEER & WINE DISTR. ASS’N, https://mbwda.org/birth-of-statebased-three-tier-alcohol-regulation (last visited Apr. 3, 2022).
55 Control State Directory and Info, NAT’L ALCOHOL BEVERAGE CONTROL ASS’N,
https://www.nabca.org/control-state-directory-and-info (last accessed Apr. 3, 2022).
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state distributor plus a minimum profit, 56 and a consumer in North
Carolina purchasing spirits for off-premises consumption must
buy from an Alcohol Beverage Control Board (“ABC”) Store,
owned by a local, governmental ABC Board, which receives all its
liquor from one of two state-owned warehouses. 57 Whether under
the three-tier distribution system or an alcohol control system,
post-Prohibition alcohol regulation treated and licensed beer,
wine, and liquor separately. 58
U.S. states are split between the three-tier distribution system
and alcohol control system approaches, but state law that tracks
one of two dominant models, similar to the split in limited liability
company (“LLC”) law between the Delaware approach and the
Uniform Limited Liability Act (“ULLCA”) approach, does not
alone qualify as “divergent.” 59 Alcohol regulations diverge in
another way via “what is known as ‘local option.’” 60 Half a century
after Prohibition ended, thirty-seven states provided for a local
option that allowed local jurisdictions to “decide whether to allow
liquor sales (wet option) or to prohibit them (dry option).” 61
Beyond those relatively binary choices, state alcohol law
demonstrates tremendous variety, with laws that are frequently
unique, odd, or both. 62

56
Vera Hogan, High Liquor Prices? Blame State, not Store, TRI-CNTY. TIMES
(July 2, 2015), https://www.tctimes.com/living/features/high-liquor-prices-blamestate-not-store/article_eedf2312-20e5-11e5-a8e3-633296715936.html.
57
John Trump, Problematic and Inefficient: House Committee Reveals
Condition of State-Run Liquor Monopoly, CAROLINA J. (May 7, 2021, 4:00 AM),
https://www.carolinajournal.com/news-article/problematic-and-inefficient-housecommittee-reveals-condition-of-state-run-liquor-monopoly/.
58 Elsner, supra note 38, at 3.
59
See, e.g., H. Justin Pace, Contracting Out of Fiduciary Duties in LLCs:
Delaware Will Lead, but Will Anyone Follow?, 16 NEV. L. J. 1085, 1092–93 (2016)
[hereinafter, Pace, Delaware] (noting that most states track the approach of Delaware
or the ULLCA in setting rules governing waivers of fiduciary duties).
60
Eugenia Froedge Toma, State Liquor Licensing, Implicit Contracting, and
Dry/Wet Counties, 26 ECON. INQUIRY 507, 508 (1988).
61 Toma, supra note 60, at 508.
62 See Levine & Reinarman, supra note 37, at 475 (“States could, and often did,
then allow for considerable local option and variation.”).
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For example, Louisiana only began allowing the sale of minibottles of liquor in 2014.63 Conversely, South Carolina only
allowed bars and restaurants to serve liquor from bottles under two
ounces until 2006, causing them to stock 1.7-ounce mini-bottles
rather than standard 750 ml bottles of liquor. 64 South Carolina
kept its mini-bottle rule fifteen years longer than the second-tolast state to end it, Utah. 65 Bartenders in Utah must still make and
pour drinks behind a partition—a “Zion curtain”—that hides the
sight from customers. 66 “[T]he only state to regulate the sale of
beer by temperature,” Indiana, allows only package liquor stores
and breweries to sell cold beer, forcing pharmacies, grocery stores,
and convenience stores to sell room-temperature beer. 67 Maryland
limits breweries to selling 3,000 barrels per year in their own
taprooms and requires any barrels past 2,000 to be first sold to a
distributor/wholesaler and then bought back by the brewery
taproom. 68 Until 2018, “Oklahoma grocery and convenience
stores could stock beer with only up to 3.2 percent alcohol
content—considerably lower than even leading light beer
brands.” 69 Liquor stores, on the other hand, were allowed to sell
beer up to 8.99 percent alcohol by volume “but were prohibited
from selling cold beer of any strength.” 70 After Oklahoma changed
its law, only two states retained 3.2 percent beer laws (creating
Wayne Curtis, Mixopedia: The Secret Life of Mini Bottles, IMBIBE MAG.
(May 23, 2018), https://imbibemagazine.com/mixopedia-mini-bottles/.
64
Ben Perrone, How Mini-Bottles Shaped Charleston’s Cocktail Culture,
CAROLINAS EATER (Oct. 16, 2015, 3:33 PM), https://carolinas.eater.com/2015/10/16/
9553903/mini-bottles-charleston-law-cocktails.
65 Id.
66 Jim Carlton, Mommy, Where Do Cocktails Come From?, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 16,
2017, 10:58 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/mommy-where-do-cocktails-comefrom-1489676329?mod=e2tw.
67 Chris Sikich, Expansion of Cold Beer Sales not on Indiana Lawmakers’ Menu
in 2019, INDYSTAR (Sept. 18, 2018, 4:05 PM), https://www.indystar.com/story/news/
politics/2018/09/18/cold-beer-sales-not-lawmakers-menu-2019/1334375002/.
68
Kelsi Loos, Bill Would Tie Taproom Barrel Limits to Brewery Production,
FREDERICK NEWS POST (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.fredericknewspost.com/news/
politics_and_government/bill-would-tie-taproom-barrel-limits-to-breweryproduction/article_032aa8e8-e16c-58ba-94ca-51f3c657d992.html.
69 Tim Talley, Minnesota Will Soon Be One of Only Two States with 3.2 Percent
Alcohol Beer Law, TWIN CITIES PIONEER PRESS (Jan. 19, 2019 PM),
https://www.twincities.com/2019/01/19/minnesota-beer-alcohol-law-groceryconvenience-stores-oklahoma-colorado-utah-kansas/.
70 Id.
63
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questions as to the viability of the 3.2 percent beer market). 71
Minnesota required in-state wineries to make their wine from a
majority of grapes grown in-state (Minnesota is not known as a
wine grape growing state) until the rule was struck down in 2020
under the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. 72
The U.S. alcohol market experienced both major endogenous
and exogenous shocks in the twenty-first century with,
respectively, the craft beer (and micro-distillery) boom and the
COVID-19 pandemic. Each has placed pressure on status quo
alcohol regulation and resulted in significant change to that
regulation. 73
B. Convergence: State Marijuana Regulation in the U.S. in

the 21st Century

Like alcohol, marijuana experienced its own temperance
movement. This followed a long period during which marijuana
was unregulated in the U.S. 74 State-level prohibition of marijuana
began in the 1910s, 75 pushed in part by what would become the
71

Id.

Ashley Brandt, Farm Wineries Win as Court Declares Minnesota Law
Mandating Use of Majority In-State Wine Ingredients in Wines Made by Farm
Wineries Facially Unconstitutional in Light of SCOTUS Dormant Commerce Clause
Jurisprudence. Bonus: We’ve got the Briefs for You., LIBATION L. BLOG (Sept. 2,
72

2020), https://libationlawblog.com/2020/09/02/farm-wineries-win-as-court-declaresminnesota-law-mandating-use-of-majority-in-state-wine-ingredients-in-wines-madeby-farm-wineries-facially-unconstitutional-in-light-of-scotus-dormant-commerceclaus/.
73
See, e.g., Alistair Williams, Exploring the Impact of Legislation on the
Development of Craft Beer, 3 Beverages 18, 19 (2017), https://www.mdpi.com/23065710/3/2/18 (discussing how the demand for craft beer in North Carolina played a
role in the state legislature loosening state alcohol regulations); Redford & Dills,
supra note 36, at 1181–82 (discussing changes to alcohol regulation in response to
the COVID-19 pandemic).
74
See Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana
Regulation, 62 UCLA L. REV. 74, 81 (2015) (“For most of American history,
marijuana was legal to grow and consume.”) (citing MARK EDDY, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
RL 33211, MEDICAL MARIJUANA: REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL AND STATE
POLICIES 1 (2010), available at https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/RL33211.pdf).
75 Chemerinsky, supra note 74, at 81 (charting the path of marijuana prohibition
in the states) (citing RICHARD J. BONNIE & CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD, THE MARIJUANA
CONVICTION: A HISTORY OF MARIJUANA PROHIBITION IN THE UNITED STATES 51–53
(1974); Michael Vitiello, Proposition 215: De Facto Legalization of Pot and the
Shortcomings of Direct Democracy, 31 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 707, 749–51 (1998)).
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U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. 76 Federal regulation of
marijuana culminated in complete federal prohibition with the
passage of the Controlled Substances Act in 1970, 77 which defined
marijuana by statute as “a drug with a high likelihood of addiction
and no safe dose” and “not approved for any medical use.” 78
Marijuana was not prohibited via constitutional amendment, but
the Supreme Court ruled in Gonzales v. Raich that federal
marijuana prohibition was constitutional. 79 Not only did the
federal government have the power to prohibit marijuana, but it
also had the power to do so in states that had ostensibly legalized
it: Raich involved two women using marijuana in compliance with
California law. 80 What the government did not have the power to
do, however, was to force the states themselves to prohibit
marijuana. 81
Despite the presence of the Controlled Substances Act, “state
marijuana laws provide the basis for nearly every marijuana arrest
in the country,” with “arrests made at the state and local level
dwarf[ing] those made by federal officials by a ratio of 109 to 1” in
2012. 82 This meant that a state-level reform effort would have a
very real effect regardless of what the federal government did.
76 Holden & Edelman, supra note 24, at 1056 (relying on Richard J. Bonnie &
Charles H. Whitebread, II, The Forbidden Fruit and the Tree of Knowledge: An
Inquiry into the Legal History of American Marijuana Prohibition, 56 VA. L. REV.
971, 1038 (1970)).
77 Robert A. Mikos, The Evolving Federal Response to State Marijuana Reforms,
26 WIDENER L. REV. 1, 3 (2020) [hereinafter, Mikos, Federal Response] (citing 21
U.S.C. §§ 841, 844).
78 Chemerinsky, supra note 74, at 82–83 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1), (c)(c)(10)).
79 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 26–27 (2005).
80 Id. at 6–7; see also Holden & Edelman, supra note 24, at 1059–60 (discussing
Gonzales v. Raich).
81 See Holden & Edelman, supra note 24, at 1067–69 (arguing that Murphy v.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018), stands for the proposition that
state marijuana legalization is protected by the anti-commandeering doctrine and
that it is not preempted by the CSA); Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy:
Medical Marijuana and the States’ Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62
VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1446–60 (2009) [hereinafter, Mikos, Limits of Supremacy]
(arguing even before Murphy that Congress had not and could not preempt state
marijuana legalization).
82
Chemerinsky, supra note 74, at 84 (relying on EZEKIAL EDWARDS ET AL., THE
WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND WHITE: BILLIONS OF DOLLARS WASTED ON RACIALLY
BIASED ARRESTS 8–9 (Vanita Gupta et al. eds., 2013); see MARK MOTIVANS, FEDERAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2010 8 (Jill Thomas ed., 2013).
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Oregon was the first state to decriminalize marijuana, 83 but the
reform wave officially kicked off when “California adopted the
nation’s first modern medical marijuana law in 1996.” 84 In what
would become a pattern, marijuana reform in California
happened via voter referendum rather than through a statute
passed by the state legislature. 85 Medical marijuana quickly picked
up steam, with Alaska, Oregon, and Washington, legalizing it in
1998; Maine in 1999; Hawaii, Colorado, and Nevada, in 2000; and
another five states by 2008.86 Notably, these states were clustered
in the West and New England, and each legalized medical
marijuana by referendum rather than by statute. 87
In part due to public threats from then-Attorney General Eric
Holder, a referendum that would have made California the first
state to legalize adult-use marijuana failed in 2010.88 The success
of the threats notwithstanding, federal law enforcement followed
up with aggressive enforcement efforts targeted at the medical
marijuana industry in three states that had legalized medical
marijuana. 89 Those enforcement efforts proved insufficient to chill
Holden & Edelman, supra note 24, at 1058.
Mikos, Federal Response, supra note 77, at 5.
85 See Chemerinsky, supra note 74, at 85 (“In 1996 California became the first
state to permit the use of marijuana for medical purposes, with voters passing
Proposition 215 by a margin of 55.6 percent to 44.4 percent.”) (citations omitted).
86
Chemerinsky, supra note 74, at 85–86 (relying on Marijuana Law Reform
Timeline, NORML, https://web.archive.org/web/20140713013741/norml.org/about/
item/marijuana-law-reform-timeline (last visited Mar. 13, 2022)).
87 See Christian Britschgi, Illinois Becomes 11th State to Legalize Weed, REASON
(June 25, 2019, 5:25 PM), https://reason.com/2019/06/25/illinois-becomes-11thstate-to-legalize-weed/ (“By signing HB 1438 into law, Pritzker has made Illinois the
first state in the country to pass a comprehensive legalization bill through its state
legislature. Nine other states have passed ballot measures legalizing the possession
and sale of recreational marijuana.”).
88
Chemerinsky, supra note 74, at 87 (relying on Feds Warn, Indict California
Medical Marijuana Dispensary Operators, ABC7 (Oct. 7, 2011), https://abc7.com/
archive/8383655/); see John Hoeffel, Holder Vows Fight Over Prop. 19, L.A. TIMES
(Oct. 16, 2010, 12 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2010-oct-16-la-memarijuana-holder-20101016-story.html; see also Votes For and Against November 2,
2010, Statewide Ballot Measures, (2010), https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/sov/2010general/07-for-against.pdf).
89 See Chemerinsky, supra note 74, at 88
Enforcement actions in the fall of 2011 made clear that the
administration meant what it said. The four U.S. Attorneys in
California combined forces in a concerted action against
California’s medical marijuana industry; Montana’s industry was
83
84
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the advent of adult-use marijuana legalization. Two years later,
ballot initiatives legalizing adult-use marijuana succeeded in
Colorado and Washington. 90
State-level legalization efforts—of both the medical and adultuse variety—accelerated toward the end of the next decade. Adultuse marijuana legalization spread beyond the West and New
England to the Midwest, with Michigan and Illinois allowing adultuse sales to begin in 2019 and 2020, respectively. 91 Notably,
Illinois became the first state to legalize adult-use marijuana by
statute. 92 In retrospect, 2020 may be the year the dam broke. The
electorate in five states voted to legalize marijuana (adult-use
marijuana in three states, medical marijuana in one state, and both
adult-use and medical marijuana in one state). 93 Markedly,
essentially shut down by law enforcement actions; and Colorado
dispensaries within a thousand feet of a school were told they must
either relocate or close their doors.
(relying on Jamie Kelly, Former Grizzly Pleads Not Guilty to Federal Drug Charges,
MISSOULIAN (Apr. 7, 2014), http://missoulian.com/news/state-and-regional/formergrizzly-pleads-not-guilty-to-federal-drug-charges/article_5166136a-4304-11e1-a886
-0019bb2963f4.html#ixzz1k1FXdfT; Medical Marijuana: Federal Crackdown,
Similar to That in California, Begins in Colorado, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 12, 2012,
4:28
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/12/
medical-marijuanafederal_n_1202725.html; Feds Warn, Indict California Medical Marijuana
Dispensary Operators, ABC7 (Oct. 7, 2011), https://abc7.com/archive/8383655).
90 Chemerinsky, supra note 74, at 88 (citing Keith Coffman & Nicole Neroulias,
Colorado, Washington First States to Legalize Recreational Pot, REUTERS (Nov. 6,
2012, 7:53 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-marijuana-legalization/
colorado-washington-first-states-to-legalize-recreational-potidUSBRE8A602D20121107; Amendments and Propositions, COLO. SEC’Y STATE,
http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/Results/Abstract/2012/general/amendProp.
html (last visited Mar. 9, 2022); November 6, 2012, General Election Abstract Of
Votes Secretary of State, OR. SEC’Y STATE (2012), http://records.sos.state.or.us/
ORSOSWebDrawer/Recordhtml/6873690; November 06, 2012, General Election
Results, Initiative Measure No. 502 Concerns Marijuana, WASH. SEC’Y STATE (Nov.
27, 2012, 4:55 PM), https://results.vote.wa.gov/results/20121106/initiative-measureno-502-concerns-marijuana_bycounty.html).
91 Pace, Free Market, supra note 2, at 1521–52 (citing Adult-Use Stores Continue
to Open; Expungement Bill Awaits Senate Action, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT (Jan.
13, 2020), https://www.mpp.org/states/michigan/; Robert McCoppin, It’s Now Only

Days Away: Jan. 1 to Usher in the Era of Legalized Recreational Weed in Illinois. ‘It
Changes Everything.’, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 27, 2019, 3:08 PM) [hereinafter, McCoppin,
Days Away], https://www.chicagotribune.com/marijuana/illinois/ct-illinois-marijuana-

legalization-on-jan-1-20191227-aa52o6wmrnegvfpgb55uedlgcq-story.html).
92 Pace, Free Market, supra note 2, at 1254 (relying on Britschgi, supra note 87).
93
Ryan Bort, Every Single Weed Initiative Passed on Election Day, ROLLING
STONE (Nov. 4, 2020, 9:30 AM), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-
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referendums passed not just in Western states like Arizona and a
liberal state (New Jersey), but also in a Southern state (Mississippi),
and in other “deep red states like Montana and South Dakota.” 94
2021 saw the dominance of reform by referendums end, as
legislatures in four states—Connecticut, New Mexico, New York,
and Virginia—legalized adult-use marijuana (Alabama also
legalized medical marijuana by statute). 95
This incremental process of legalization has led to state
marijuana regulation converging, as reformers learned how to
build a politically palatable proposal from the experience of
reformers in states that moved previously. 96 There are four
with
important
areas
of
convergence:
regulation,
decriminalization; adult-use license preferences for existing
medical marijuana licensees; an opt-out option for local
jurisdictions; and, most recently, social justice provisions. Early
reform efforts had a “more libertarian feel,” focusing on
decriminalization rather than legalization and regulation. 97 In
Oregon, for example, shifting the focus to regulation resulted in a
nine-point swing in referendum results in just a two-year span. 98
Reforms typically include decriminalization in addition to
regulation, removing criminal penalties for the possession of small
amounts of marijuana while setting up a framework to regulate the
sale of marijuana. 99
news/marijuana-election-guide-state-legalization-ballot-measures-1077510/). South
Dakota’s successful referendum legalizing hemp, medical marijuana, and adult-use
marijuana was overturned by the South Dakota Supreme Court for violating the
state’s single subject rule for constitutional amendments. South Dakota’s Supreme
Court Rules Against Legalization of Recreational Marijuana, NPR (Nov. 24, 2021,
1:08 PM), https://www.npr.org/2021/11/24/1058884032/south-dakotas-supremecourt-rules-against-legalization-of-recreational-marijuana.
94
Kris Krane, 2021: The Least Eventful Year for Marijuana, FORBES (Dec. 31,
2021, 12:34 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kriskrane/2021/12/31/2021-the-leasteventful-year-for-marijuana/?sh=bc1f24432554.
95 Id.
96
See JOHN HUDAK & CHRISTINE STENGLEIN, PUBLIC OPINION AND AMERICA’S
EXPERIMENTATION WITH CANNABIS REFORM IN MARIJUANA FEDERALISM: UNCLE SAM
AND MARY JANE 20 (Jonathan H. Adler, ed., 2020) (“Although differences exist among
state systems, many state-based cannabis reform ballot initiatives build upon others,
and there is a degree of policy learning from the experiences of other states.”).
97 See Wallach & Rauch, supra note 35, at 14 (comparing an earlier, unsuccessful
reform effort in Oregon to a later, successful effort).
98 Wallach & Rauch, supra note 35, at 14.
99
See Pace, Free Market, supra note 2, at 1252 (“The [Michigan] 2018

PACE (DO NOT DELETE)

640

9/5/2022 8:40 AM

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 46:3

Giving existing medical marijuana licensees priority access to
adult-use licenses has become a standard feature of legalization
efforts, appearing in Arizona, Illinois, and Michigan, for
example.100 Montana went even further, giving existing medical
marijuana licensees an eighteen-month head start on adult-use
sales. 101
Another aspect of contemporary U.S. marijuana
referendum immediately decriminalized marijuana.”) (relying on Kathleen Gray,
Legal Marijuana in Michigan: What You Need to Know, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Nov.
7, 2018, 5:37 PM), https://www.freep.com/story/news/marijuana/2018/11/07/
michigan-marijuana-results-election-legalization/1835297002/); Key Dates in
Connecticut’s New Cannabis Legislation, NBC CONN. (Sept. 28, 2021, 10:40 PM)
[hereinafter, Key Dates], https://www.nbcconnecticut.com/news/local/key-dates-inconnecticuts-new-cannabis-legislation/2522672/ (“As of July 1 it is legal for adults 21
years and older to possess up to 1.5 ounces (42.5 grams) of marijuana” in
Connecticut.); Curtis Segarra, Recreational Marijuana Becomes Legal in New Mexico
on June 29, KRQE NEWS (Jun. 30, 2021, 10:48 AM), https://www.krqe.com/
news/marijuana/recreational-marijuana-becomes-legal-in-new-mexico-on-june-29/
(“Within the [New Mexico] law, personal use will be legal as of June 29, 2021.”); Ned
Oliver, Marijuana Will be Legal in Virginia on July 1. Here’s What is and isn’t
Permitted Under the New Law, VA. MERCURY (April 7, 2021, 5:46 PM),
https://www.virginiamercury.com/2021/04/07/marijuana-will-be-legal-in-virginia-onjuly-1-heres-what-is-and-isnt-permitted-under-the-new-law/ (noting Virginia’s statute
immediately decriminalizes possession of up to one ounce of marijuana by persons
21 and older); New Jersey Governor Signs Laws to Legalize Marijuana Use,
Decriminalize Possession, NBC NEWS (Feb. 22, 2021, 1:54 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/new-jersey-governor-signs-laws-legalizemarijuana-use-decriminalize-possession-n1258534 (noting that legislation passed in
response to a successful referendum decriminalizes possession of small amounts of
marijuana for adults and provides for written warnings for underage possession of
marijuana); Ray Stern, Arizona Just Legalized Marijuana—Now What?, PHX. NEW
TIMES
(Nov.
5,
2020,
6:00
AM),
https://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/
marijuana/arizona-legal-marijuana-faq-answers-experts-legalization-prop-207-law11510843 (noting Arizona’s referendum decriminalizes possession of up to one
ounce of marijuana by persons 21 and older); McCoppin, Days Away, supra note 91
(“Under the new state law, adult residents [of Illinois] 21 and over may possess up to
30 grams of flower, 5 grams of concentrates, and 500 milligrams of THC in infused
edibles and other products, and visitors may have half that much.”).
100
Pace, Free Market, supra note 2, at 1255 (citing Jonah Meadows, Illinois
Marijuana Dispensary License Applications Unveiled, PATCH (Oct. 2, 2019, 11:37
AM),
https://patch.com/illinois/springfield-il/marijuana-dispensary-licenseapplications-unveiled-regulators).
101
Lindsey Stenger, Marijuana Retailer Prepares for Legalization in Montana,
KRTV GREAT FALLS (Dec. 30, 2021, 6:02 PM), https://www.krtv.com/news/montanaand-regional-news/marijuana-retailers-prepare-for-legalization-in-montana; see also
German Lopez, Vermont Legalizes Marijuana Sales, VOX (Oct. 8, 2020, 11:30 AM),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/10/8/21507594/vermont-marijuanalegalization-sales (noting concern by the governor that the legalization scheme as
passed “would give ‘an unfair head start on market access’ to medical marijuana
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legalization that shows convergence is the option for local
jurisdictions to opt out of allowing dispensaries to operate within
their jurisdiction. The regulatory schemes in Illinois, Michigan,
Montana, New Jersey, and New York include an opt-out option. 102
Opt-out is popular. Roughly half of local jurisdictions in New York
opted out of allowing dispensaries and consumption sites. 103
A more recent addition to reform efforts is social justice
provisions. Both Connecticut and Illinois, for example, give
priority in granting dispensary license applications to “social
equity applicants” disproportionality impacted by marijuana
prohibition. 104 Arizona set aside twenty-six social equity licenses
for “groups disproportionately affected by anti-marijuana laws.” 105
New York reserved a large portion of adult-use licensees “for
minority business owners, disabled veterans and distressed
farmers, among others” and plans to invest a portion of the tax
revenue from marijuana sales into “communities affected by
racially disproportionate policing on drugs.” 106 Additionally,
Arizona, Illinois, New Mexico, New York, Vermont, and Virginia
businesses over new entrants”).
102
Pace, Free Market, supra note 2, at 1255–56 (citing Kathleen Gray, Legal
Marijuana in Michigan: What You Need to Know, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Nov. 7, 2018,
5:37
PM),
https://www.freep.com/story/news/marijuana/2018/11/07/michiganmarijuana-results-election-legalization/1835297002/)); McCoppin, Days Away, supra
note 91); Legal Recreational Marijuana Sales Begin in Montana, MTN NEWS (Jan. 1,
2022, 12:41 PM), https://www.kpax.com/news/montana-news/legal-recreationalmarijuana-sales-begin-in-montana; Luis Ferré-Sadurní & Troy Closson, New York
Has Legalized Marijuana. Here’s What to Know., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/article/new-york-marijuana-legalization-facts.html; Amy S.
Rosenberg, Legally Buying Weed at the Jersey Shore Will Depend on What Town
You’re in, PHILA. INQUIRER (April 26, 2021), https://www.inquirer.com/news/newjersey-shore-cannabis-law-opt-out-20210426.html; see also Oliver, supra note 99
(noting that the legalization bill in Virginia deferred decisions on priority for existing
medical marijuana licensees, opt-out for local jurisdictions, and provisions for social
equity).
103 Kary, supra note 28.
104 See Pace, Free Market, supra note 2, at 1253 (citing Jonah Meadows, Illinois
Marijuana Dispensary License Applications Unveiled, PATCH (Oct. 2, 2019, 11:37
AM),
https://patch.com/illinois/springfield-il/marijuana-dispensary-licenseapplications-unveiled-regulators) (noting that Illinois set up a “points-based scoring
system that includes social metrics to evaluate applicants”)); Key Dates, supra note
99 (noting that half of licenses in Connecticut were set aside for social equity
applicants).
105 Stern, supra note 99.
106 Ferré-Sadurní & Closson, supra note 102.
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all provided for expungement of prior marijuana convictions.107
C. Divergence: Province Marijuana Regulation in Canada

Post-Prohibition

Unlike in the U.S., where the states have led reform efforts
while the federal government has dragged its feet, the Canadian
federal legislature was the body to legalize marijuana, albeit
reserving an important role for the provinces, the Canadian subnational units that serve as analogs to U.S. states. 108 Marijuana
prohibition in Canada lasted ninety-five years until medical
marijuana “was deemed a constitutionally protected right” in
2000. 109 With the passage of the Canadian Cannabis Act, Canada
legalized adult-use marijuana nationwide in 2018. 110
A federal regulator “controls the licensing of all cultivator and
cultivation facilities, defines legal product forms and testing
standards, and sets a minimum standard for purchase aid,” but
“[i]ndividual Canadian provinces have jurisdiction over retail
distribution and sales in their province, whether through
government-operated or privately-operated businesses and
through physical stores or online and mail-order.” 111 As in the
U.S., local jurisdictions play an important role in Canadian
marijuana regulation. 112 Provincial governments determine “how
Ferré-Sadurní & Closson, supra note 102; Oliver, supra note 99; Kyle Jaeger,
New Mexico Marijuana Legalization Law Officially Takes Effect, MARIJUANA MOMENT
107

(June 29,
2021),
https://www.marijuanamoment.net/new-mexico-marijuanalegalization-law-officially-takes-effect/; Robert McCoppin, Illinois Expunges Nearly
Half a Million Cannabis Cases as Part of Legalization, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 31, 2020, 5:42
PM),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/marijuana/illinois/ct-illinois-marijuanapardons-expungements-20201231-mrhs3n7tsvchthlfexg3c5zdwm-story.html; Stern,
supra note 99; Lopez, supra note 101.
108 Canada actually has two types of sub-national units, provinces and territories.
Canada is made up of ten provinces and three territories. “There is a clear
constitutional distinction between provinces and territories,” Provinces and
Territories, CANADA, https://www.canada.ca/en/intergovernmental-affairs/services/
provinces-territories.html (last accessed on May 25, 2022), but that distinction does
not prove materially important to the arguments made in this article. For the sake
of simplicity, I will refer to Canada’s sub-national units as provinces throughout.
109 de Koning & McArdle, supra note 14, at 367.
110 de Koning & McArdle, supra note 14, at 363.
111 Lawrence J. Trautman et al., Cannabis at the Crossroads: A Transdisciplinary
Analysis and Policy Prescription, 45 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 125, 164 (2021).
112
See de Koning & McArdle, supra note 14, at 368 (“[R]egulation of the
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retail sales of cannabis products are regulated within their
jurisdiction,” while “[m]unicipal governments exercise control
over retail location, hours of operation, licensing, and other
operational aspects of business activity through their power to
regulate land use, zoning, and business licensing requirements via
local ordinances.” 113 Federal legalization offers advantages for
Canadian marijuana businesses, such as the ability to access major
stock exchanges.114
Similar to U.S. states after the end of Prohibition, Canadian
provinces can be divided into broad categories. In five provinces
(Quebec, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, and
Northwest Territories), “the [provincial] government is the sole
supplier of” adult-use marijuana. 115 In seven provinces (British
Columbia, Alberta, Manitoba, Ontario, Newfoundland &
Labrador, 116 Yukon, and Nunavut), “the [provincial] government
takes control of—and participates in—some aspect of the market
supply chain.” 117 Only one province (Saskatchewan) has adopted a
private market model. 118 That is, in twelve of Canada’s thirteen
provinces the province controls a monopoly in distribution,
physical retail, online retail, or some combination thereof. 119 In
five provinces, (Quebec, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince
Edward Island, and Northwest Territories (“NWT”)), the
provincial government monopolizes all three. 120 In five other
provinces (British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario, Newfoundland &
Labrador, and Yukon), the provincial government monopolizes

recreational cannabis market is operationalized at three levels—federal, provincial,
and municipal.”).
113 de Koning & McArdle, supra note 14, at 368.
114 Trautman et al., supra note 111, at 165–66.
115 de Koning & McArdle, supra note 14, at 369.
116
Newfoundland & Labrador is one province, not two. See Newfoundland
Labrador, https://www.newfoundlandlabrador.com/ (last accessed May 25, 2022).
117 de Koning & McArdle, supra note 14, at 369.
118
de Koning & McArdle, supra note 14, at 370. Lawmakers in New Mexico
considered providing for the sale of marijuana in state-run stores, but ultimately
crafted a regulatory framework similar to other U.S. states. Jaeger, supra note 107.
119 See de Koning & McArdle, supra note 14, at 369 (noting Saskatchewan is the
only Canadian province whose private market model consists of the government
acting as a regulator, instead of a market participant).
120 de Koning & McArdle, supra note 14, at 370, tbl.2.
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distribution and online retail. 121 In two provinces (Manitoba and
Nunavut), the provincial government monopolizes distribution
but not retail, whether physical or online. 122 New Brunswick
initially monopolized all three, “only to realize that the approach
did not work” and switch to a concessionaire model where a single
private company would be granted a twenty-year monopoly
(similar to how some U.S. alcohol control states approach
distribution).123 And in three provinces (British Columbia, Yukon,
and Nunavut), government and private retail co-exist. 124
Among provinces that do not monopolize retail, there is also
a basic split in the approach to initial license quantity. 125 Six
provinces (British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba,
Nunavut, and Yukon) have made a relatively large number of
licenses available, similar to the approach they have taken for
alcohol. 126
Two provinces (Ontario and Newfoundland &
Labrador) have “strictly regulated the number of licenses
issued.” 127 Marijuana will be presented for sale alongside alcohol,
notwithstanding a task force recommendation to the contrary. 128
The government holds a monopoly over distribution (similar to
the approach taken in other alcohol control states) in all but one
province (Saskatchewan). 129 This means that a marijuana producer
that wants to sell to consumers in those provinces would need to
sell their product to the government distributor and then buy it
de Koning & McArdle, supra note 14, at 370, tbl.2.
de Koning & McArdle, supra note 14, at 370, tbl.2.
123 de Koning & McArdle, supra note 14, at 388.
124 de Koning & McArdle, supra note 14, at 370, tbl.2 ; de Koning & McArdle,
supra note 14, at 382 (noting government and (heavily regulated) private retailers
co-existing presents risks and ethical concerns of its own. In British Columbia, for
example, the government sold marijuana online “at a price 30% lower than [private,
physical retailers] could afford to match.”).
125
See Chelsea Cox, The Canadian Cannabis Act Legalizes and Regulates
Recreational Cannabis Use in 2018, 122 HEALTH POL’Y 205, 208 (2018) (stating
similar to the approach taken in some U.S. alcohol control states, in these provinces
“the existing liquor corporations take full control of cannabis distribution, sale, and
oversight”).
126 de Koning & McArdle, supra note 14, at 369.
127
de Koning & McArdle, supra note 14, at 369. Ontario initially made only
twenty-five licenses available (via lottery). de Koning & McArdle, supra note 14,
at 385.
128 de Koning & McArdle, supra note 14, at 369; Cox, supra note 125, at 208.
129 de Koning & McArdle, supra note 14, at 371.
121
122
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back. 130 Only three provinces (Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and
Nunavut) allowed private market participants to handle online
sales. 131 Provincial marijuana regulation shows a strong east-west
split, with eastern provinces taking a more restrictive approach. 132
As is common in the U.S., individual jurisdictions in Canada
can (and often do) opt out of allowing dispensaries. 133 Even with a
federal stamp of approval, and perhaps in part due to the use of
unwieldy government monopolies, Canada lags the U.S. in
marijuana sales. There were only $2 billion in marijuana sales in
Canada in 2020 compared to $17.5 billion in sales in the U.S. 134
The province of Ontario actually managed to lose $42 million
engaging in the online sale and wholesale distribution of
marijuana. 135 Physical dispensary openings got off to a slow start.
Data collected in the first two months after legalization identified
only “[twenty-two] online stores and 163 physical storefronts”
operating nationwide.136 The number of physical dispensaries had
grown to 535 a year later (from the end of 2018 to the end of
2019). 137 By 2021, there were close to three thousand. 138
As with U.S. states and alcohol, Canadian provinces have a
number of idiosyncratic marijuana regulations.
Only
Saskatchewan allows retailers to order product directly from
producers.139 This has allowed retailers there to move more quickly
and avoid the supply chain issues that have bedeviled retailers in
other provinces. 140 Saskatchewan is also the only province to allow
130
Priyashni Goundar et al., A Comparative Analysis of Laws on Recreational
Cannabis Edibles Between Canada and the United States of America, 94 INT’L J.

DRUG POL’Y 1, 4 (2021).
131 de Koning & McArdle, supra note 14, at 373.
132
This shows similarities to the U.S., where western states have generally led
the way in marijuana legalization. Pace, Free Market, supra note 2, at 1251.
133 Kary, supra note 28.
134 Lam, supra note 24.
135 The Ontario Government Lost $42M Selling Cannabis in the Last Year, CBC
News (Sept. 13, 2019, 2:55 PM), https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/ontariocannabis-loss-1.5282994.
136
Syed Mahamad et al., Availability, Retail Price and Potency of Legal and
Illegal Cannabis in Canada after Recreational Cannabis Legalisation, 39 DRUG &
ALCOHOL REV. 337, 339 (2020).
137 de Koning & McArdle, supra note 14, at 377.
138 Kary, supra note 28.
139 de Koning & McArdle, supra note 14, at 383.
140 de Koning & McArdle, supra note 14, at 383 (citing Sask. Stores Get Cannabis
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retailers to transfer product between retail locations. 141 Manitoba
set up a private quasi-monopoly, giving licenses to four companies
with the “clearly stated objective to ensure that 90% of the
population was within a 30-minute drive” of a dispensary. 142
Quebec prohibits marijuana edibles that look like a “toy, fruit,
animal or real or fictional character” or that “are sweets,
confectionary, dessert, or chocolate.” 143 Originally, nineteen was
the minimum age to purchase marijuana, including edibles, “in all
Canadian provinces and territories except for Alberta and Quebec,
where the legal age” was set as eighteen.144 After a change in
government, Quebec raised the minimum age to purchase
marijuana products to twenty-one. 145 Manitoba allows orders by
app for home delivery.146 Tax rates vary by province. 147
Edibles Just In Time for the Holidays, CBC NEWS (Dec. 24, 2019),
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/saskatchewan/cannabis-edibles-in-time-holidays1.5408102).
141 de Koning & McArdle, supra note 14, at 383.
142 de Koning & McArdle, supra note 14, at 383–84.
143 Goundar et al., supra note 130, at 4 (citing Regulation to Determine Other
Classes of Cannabis that may be Sold by the Société Québécoise du Cannabis and
Certain Standards Respecting the Composition and Characteristics of Cannabis,

(2019),
https://www.legisquebec.gouv.qc.ca/en/document/cr/CLÉGISQUÉBEC
5.3,%20r.%200.1%20/).
144 Goundar et al., supra note 130, at 4 (citing Authorized Cannabis Retailers in
the Provinces and Territories, GOV’T CAN., https://www.canada.ca/en/healthcanada/services/drugs-medication/cannabis/laws-regulations/provinces-territories
.html#a4 (last modified Mar. 9, 2022)); Legal Age to Buy Cannabis in Quebec is Now
21, the Highest in Canada, CBC NEWS (Jan. 1, 2020, 4:00 AM), [hereinafter, Legal
Age],
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/legal-age-cannabis-edibles1.5399211.
145 Legal Age, supra note 144.
146 de Koning & McArdle, supra note 14, at 383.
147 See, e.g., Goundar et al., supra note 130, at 5 (“In select Canadian provinces–
Alberta, Nunavut, Ontario, and Saskatchewan–the flat-rate additional cannabis duty
is adjusted by 16.8%, 19.3%, 3.9%, and 6.45% respectively. Consumers, at the time
of purchase pay a consumer sales tax which varies from 5% to 15% depending on the
province.”) (citing Charge and Collect the Tax – Which Rate to Charge, GOV’T CAN.,
https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/services/tax/businesses/topics/gst-hstbusinesses/charge-collect-which-rate.html (last modified May 5, 2021); EDN60

Calculation of Cannabis Duty and Additional Cannabis Duty on Cannabis Oil, Edible
Cannabis, Cannabis Extracts and Cannabis Topicals, GOV’T CAN. (Apr. 2019),

https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/services/formspublications/publications/edn60/calculation-cannabis-duty-additional-cannabisduty-cannabis-oil-cannabis-edibles-extracts-topicals.html); see also Goundar et al.,
supra note 130, at 5 (finding that U.S. tax rates vary from state to state).
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The variance in state regulations causes substantial variation
in legal price by province. 148 Illegal prices vary less and are
generally lower. 149 The variance in state regulations has also led to
substantial variation in the ratio of physical storefronts to
residents, with ratios in 2019 ranging from one storefront for every
7,471 residents to one storefront for every 606,939 residents. 150
Population density helps drive the variation in ratio, but Alberta,
with little over a tenth of Canada’s population, was home to almost
half of its physical retail storefronts in 2019. 151 Unsurprisingly, the
six provinces (British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba,
Nunavut, and Yukon) that make licenses broadly available account
for only thirty-two percent of Canada’s population, but 77.2
percent of its physical retail storefronts. 152 The two provinces
(Ontario and Newfoundland & Labrador) that sharply restrict
license quantity, account for 40.2 percent of Canada’s population,
but only 8.1 percent of its physical retail storefronts. 153

See Mahamad et al., supra note 136, at 339 (finding that legal prices varied
among provinces by over eighty percent when purchasing small amounts of
marijuana).
149 See Mahamad et al., supra note 136, at 339, 344 (finding that illegal prices
were “significantly lower than legal” prices and varied among provinces by seventeen
percent to twenty percent when purchasing small amounts of marijuana). Prices
tended to converge at larger amounts. Mahamad et al., supra note 136; see also
Trautman et al., supra note 111, at 179 (“In Canada, as in the U.S. states, the
complexities and costs of the current environment not only pose a burden to
[marijuana] businesses but have created a significant disincentive for some consumers
to participate in the legal market.”).
150 de Koning & McArdle, supra note 14, at 377, tbl.3.
151 de Koning & McArdle, supra note 14, at 377, tbl.3 (finding in 2019, Alberta
was home to 11.6 percent of Canadians and 47.7 percent of physical marijuana
dispensaries).
152 de Koning & McArdle, supra note 14, at 377, tbl.3.
153
de Koning & McArdle, supra note 14, at 377, tbl.3 (finding that the five
provinces that monopolize retail account for 27.8 percent of Canada’s population
and 14.7 percent of its physical retail storefronts); de Koning & McArdle, supra note
14, at 377–78.
148

PACE (DO NOT DELETE)

648

9/5/2022 8:40 AM

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL
III.

[Vol. 46:3

AN INTEREST GROUP, PATH DEPENDENCY, AND
TEMPORAL THEORY OF CONVERGENCE

For the three bodies of law explored above, each reflecting
policy and lawmaking by a sub-national body post-prohibition of a
vice substance, two show signs of divergence in the law, and one
shows signs of convergence. Further confusing matters, we see
divergence in Canadian marijuana legalization and convergence
in U.S. marijuana legalization despite both happening roughly
contemporaneously. This divide can largely be explained by path
dependency (and by conditions obviating path dependency),
interest group politics, and temporal factors.
Divergence has its disadvantages. One of the chief advantages
of sub-national units joining together under one federalist nation
is to create “a common market that is larger and more efficient
than one in which international borders impede the flow of goods,
services and capital.” 154 Divergent state law diminishes those
efficiency gains. Dealing with a thicket of disparate regulations
raises the cost for a business to operate across state lines, cutting
into economies of scale. A state that adopts inefficient rules for its
businesses (including alcohol and marijuana businesses) inflicts
costs on those businesses and puts itself at a competitive
disadvantage relative to other states. 155 While divergence reflecting
the differing policy preferences of heterogenous electorates is to
be expected, convergence reflecting sound policymaking is to be
expected as well, and likely the stronger factor.
Substantial effort is devoted toward convergence in other
areas of the law. The Uniform Law Commission (“ULC”) has
published “more than 300 uniform acts.” 156 Many have been quite
successful. All fifty states have adopted Article 9 of the Uniform
154
155

Choudhry & Hume, supra note 18, at 360.
See Gelter, supra note 7, at 8 (“Convergence theory posits that market forces

reward efficient economies and legal systems and push them towards adopting
efficient rules.”); cf. Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 23, at 134–35 (“Countries that fail
to adopt efficient rules would inflict costs on their corporations, which would then be
worth less and would then be less able to raise capital; as a result, firms, factories, and
businesses might suffer, or they might migrate away from the country.”) (citations
omitted).
156
What Kinds of Legal Issues Does the ULC Address?, UNIF. L. COMM’N,
https://www.uniformlaws.org/aboutulc/faq#What%20kinds%20of%20legal%20issues
%20does%20the%20ULC%20address? (last accessed May 25, 2022).
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Commercial Act governing secured transactions. 157 Forty-one
states have adopted the 1997 Partnership Act, more commonly
known as the Revised Partnership Act (“RUPA”), while forty-nine
had previously adopted the original Uniform Partnership Act. 158
The ULC is not the only game in town: the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners publishes model insurance laws, 159
and the American Bar Association published, among others, the
Model Business Corporation Act. 160 A single state can influence its
fellow states, as exemplified by Delaware and limited liability
company law. 161 The same can be said of judges, with the state
court service of judges like Benjamin Cardozo and Roger Traynor
having a substantial effect on the common law of other states by
winning “the market of judicial reasoning.” 162 Similarly, federal
law can be a force for convergence. State constitutional law, for
example, tends to follow federal constitutional law. 163

157
UCC Article 9, Secured Transactions, UNIF. L. COMM’N,
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=6317f
73b-badb-47b2-8a5a-58ee62032ba1 (last accessed Apr. 6, 2022).
158 Partnership Act, UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/
community-home?CommunityKey=52456941-7883-47a5-91b6-d2f086d0bb44 (last
accessed Apr. 6, 2022).
159
See generally Jingshu Luo et al., Interest Group and Policy Diffusion: The
Case of NAIC Model Laws (Jan. 3, 2022) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
160
Model Business Corporation Act 2016 Revision, AM. BAR ASS’N, (Dec. 9,
2017),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/business_law
/corplaws/2016_mbca.authcheckdam.pdf.
161 See generally, Pace, Delaware, supra note 59, at 1092–93 (noting that most
states track the approach of Delaware or the ULLCA in setting rules governing
waivers of fiduciary duties).
162
JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 20 (Oxford Univ. Press 2018).
163 See Bauries, supra note 17, at 303
Studies of the convergence and divergence of state and federal
constitutional law doctrine have generally focused on state
interpretation or application of state constitutional provisions with
analogues in the federal document. As Professor Williams points
out, as to such analogous provisions, doctrinal convergence is the
overwhelming majority approach among state courts.
(relying on ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 194
(2009)).
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That being said, uniform and model acts explain little about
why alcohol law in the U.S. has resisted convergence or why
marijuana law does converge—uniform laws exist for neither. 164
Policymaking in both areas is marked by contradictory policy
goals, 165 but that lacks explanatory power for convergence and
divergence. Law does not automatically update to match the
policy preferences of the public—or even represent the results of
logrolling 166 by current interest groups. Law in the U.S. (and
Canada) tends toward stability by design. Pushing almost any
serious reform through a state legislature requires expending
serious political capital. Existing rules have an additional
advantage because “institutions and structures might have already
developed to address needs and problems arising under these
rules.” 167 Both government and business bear transition costs that
may prevent a switch to otherwise better policy. 168 Amending
existing regulatory frameworks can “have unforeseeable ripple
effects and undermine legal certainty.” 169 Laws and regulatory
structures that are a product of a specific place and time,
responding to specific events can and often do then persist long
after. 170
The ULC did convene an Alcohol Direct-Shipping Compliance Act
Committee charged with drafting “a uniform or model law addressing registration
and licensing of the direct sale of wine to consumers and the prevention of illegal
sales.” Alcohol Direct-Shipping Compliance Act Committee, UNIF. L. COMM’N,
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=ae85
397d-c04e-465d-a44b-b308d42b3160 (last accessed Apr. 6, 2022).
165 See, e.g., Pennock & Kerr, supra note 42, at 383
Alcohol policy has typically been somewhat contradictory both in
the United States and Western Europe. On the one hand,
governments have often promoted the production of alcoholic
beverages, motivated by desires for tax revenue and for
agricultural prosperity. On the other hand, governments have also
engaged in control policies, including marketing controls, in order
to reduce the social and personal costs of alcohol misuse.
166
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (5th ed. Oxford Univ. Press)
(“Cooperation between representatives in national or local legislatures to support
other members’ bids for public money in return for support for measures to benefit
their own constituents.”).
167 Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 23, at 156.
168 See Gelter, supra note 7, at 8 (“Even if change would be economically efficient
in principle, switching could be prohibitively costly.”).
169 See Gelter, supra note 7, at 10.
170 Cf. Levine & Reinarman, supra note 37, at 466 (“The production, sale, and
164
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Add interest group politics into the mix, and path
dependence results. Even as states may converge culturally and
economically, their laws may continue to diverge for this reason. 171
Any regulatory framework interferes with the market and results
in winners and losers. The winners have much to lose if the
regulatory framework is updated and so have a strong incentive to
expend substantial resources to defend their existing
advantages. 172 In democracies, strongly motivated minorities tend
to win out over weakly motivated majorities. 173 This can prevent
the adoption of optimal policies. 174 For example, South Carolina’s
mini-bottle rule created a “Baptists and bootleggers” coalition in
support of the rule, consisting not only of literal Baptists (who
supported a rule that made alcohol consumption more costly and
distribution of alcoholic beverages today is still largely governed by the alcohol
control structures designed and implemented at that time [after Prohibition].”);
Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 23, at 129
Because of this path dependence, a country’s pattern of ownership
structures at any point in time depends partly on the patterns it
had earlier.
Consequently, when countries had different
ownership structures at earlier points in time—because of their
different circumstances at the time, or even because of historical
accidents—these differences might persist at later points in time
even if their economies have otherwise become quite similar.
171 Cf. Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 23, at 134
Take two countries and assume that, while different in their initial
corporate structures and legal rules, the two became identical some
time ago in terms of their economies, politics, types of firms,
cultures, norms, and ideologies. Could differences in corporate
structures still persist? They could to the extent that a country’s
corporate structures and rules depend, as we will argue, on the
country’s initial corporate structures and rules.
172 See Gelter, supra note 7, at 9 (“Past institutional choices have created interest
groups whose members enjoy advantages from the present system. Such interest
groups will lobby against changes that eliminate rents they draw from the current
institutional arrangement.”); Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 23, at 131, 163
If the initial pattern provides one group of players with relatively
more wealth and power, this group would have a better chance to
have [legal] rules that it favors down the road. . . . The changes in
legal rules that would likely induce the fiercest opposition from
interest groups would be ones that directly reduce their rents.
173
See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
174 See Gelter, supra note 7, at 8 (“A jurisdiction may be at a local optimum that
can be reached without incurring a prohibitive cost, but it will not move to the global
optimum because the cost would fall heavily on one interest group that has the
political power to block change.”).
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presumably reduced consumption) but also of liquor wholesalers
(who benefited from the higher margins on mini-bottles). 175 New
market entrants often choose legal certainty over pushing the
outer bounds of the existing regulatory framework. 176 And
industry lawyers have an incentive to both protect “human capital
specialized in the current rules” and “requirements that give them
a source of income.” 177
Interest groups play an important role in policymaking,
including its spread from state to state. 178 The alcohol industry is
an obvious interest group in the context of alcohol regulation. 179
Similarly, it is an interest group in the context of marijuana
regulation. 180 For states that take the three-tier distribution system
See Paul Wachter, Bigger is Better: How Tiny Bottles got Booted out of South
Carolina’s Bars, LEGAL AFF. (Apr. 2006), https://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/March175

April-2006/scene_Wachter_marapr06.msp (explaining that liquor wholesalers
supported the rule but that it fell after the South Carolina Baptist Convention finally
changed its position). Interestingly, one study focused on referendums found “no
relationship between the legalization of medical marijuana and . . . adherence to
evangelical Protestantism.” Cynthia Rugeley et al., Direct Democracy, Policy
Diffusion, and Medicalized Marijuana, 40 POL. & THE LIFE SCI. 72, 76 (2021). Another
study focused on statutory legalization of medical marijuana found a correlation
between the number of evangelical adherents in a state and a lowered likelihood of
legalization. A. Lee Hannah & Daniel J. Mallinson, Defiant Innovation: The
Adoption of Medical Marijuana Laws in the American States, 46 THE POL’Y STUD. J.
402, 416 (2018).
176 See Gelter, supra note 7, at 9 (“While market participants may be willing to
take risks, they put a premium on legal certainty. Lawyers therefore proceed on
trodden paths.”); but see generally, H. Justin Pace, Rogue Corporations: Unlawful
Corporate Conduct and Fiduciary Duty, 85 MO. L. REV. 1 (2020); Elizabeth Pollman
& Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 383 (2017)
(discussing businesses that strategically seek to break and change the law).
177 Gelter, supra note 7, at 10.
178 See Kristin N. Garrett & Joshua M. Jansa, Interest Group Influence in Policy
Diffusion Networks, 15 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 387, 390 (2015) (flagging “studies
showing that interest group campaigns played a role in the spread of urban wage
laws and same-sex marriage bans”) (citing Donald P. Haider-Markel, Policy Diffusion

as a Geographical Expansion of the Scope of Political Conflict: Same-Sex Marriage
Bans in the 1990s, 1 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 5 (2001); Isaac Martin, Dawn of the Living
Wage: The Diffusion of a Redistributive Municipal Policy, 36 URB. AFF. REV. 470
(2001)).

See Levine & Reinarman, supra note 37, at 470 (“[T]he liquor industry (like
most other U.S. industries) gained increasing influence over the agencies that were
supposed to regulate it” post-Prohibition).
180
See Pace, supra note 2, at 1264 (noting that the alcohol industry has not
fought marijuana legalization, which suggests that alcohol and marijuana are not
substitute goods) (citing Wallach & Rauch, supra note 35, at 8).
179
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approach to alcohol regulation, distributors are an important
interest group. 181 In alcohol control states, public policymakers
and employees of the state monopoly form an interest group in
favor of the status quo. 182 Distributors that might prefer the threetier distribution system are a less important interest group than in
a three-tier distribution system state because they have weaker
incentives. Dry counties persist in part because liquor stores in
neighboring wet counties oppose a change in status. 183 In each
case, the initial regulatory approach created interest groups with
an incentive to maintain the status quo.
Interest group analysis is especially relevant in the marijuana
context because “[m]ost observers of direct democracy now agree
that initiatives and referendums lead to relatively high levels of
interest group activity,” 184 as, until very recently, legalization only
happened by referendums. 185 Marijuana legalization made slow
initial progress in the U.S., likely, in part, because it lacked interest
groups in support. But support for legalization has grown steadily.
This century, support for marijuana legalization doubled to a
record-high sixty-eight percent of Americans.186 Legalization is an
issue of low political salience (Americans do not list it among the
most important issues driving their votes), but the high level of
support makes referendums feasible. Without a legal or quasilegal market, the sorts of commercial interests typically active in a
regulatory space have not been present until recently. 187 With
medical or adult-use marijuana now legal in most U.S. states and
181 See O’Brien, supra note 50, at 988 (“Wholesalers wield tremendous clout at
the capitol.”).
182 Redford & Dills, supra note 36, at 1178–1179 (citations omitted).
183
Redford & Dills, supra note 36, at 1178 (citing Jeremy Horpedahl,

Bootleggers, Baptists and Ballots: Coalitions in Arkansas’ Alcohol-Legalization
Elections, PUB. CHOICE (forthcoming)).
184 Christopher A. Cooper et al., Perceptions of Power: Interest Groups in Local
Politics, 37 STATE & LOC. GOV’T REV. 206, 207 (2005). Contra id. at 212 (finding
“that cities with initiatives and/or referendums do not have higher relative levels of
interest group activity”).
185 See Pace, Free Market, supra note 2, at 1254 (noting that Illinois in 2020 was
“the first state to provide for legalization and regulation of adult-use marijuana sales
legislatively”) (citing Britschgi, supra note 87).
186 Support for Legal Marijuana Holds at Record High of 68%, GALLUP (Nov. 4,
2021), https://news.gallup.com/poll/356939/support-legal-marijuana-holds-recordhigh.aspx.
187 Wallach & Rauch, supra note 35, at 11.
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Canada, that is no longer the case.
Because existing medical marijuana customers can switch to
buying at adult-use dispensaries, existing medical marijuana
dispensaries are an important interest group for adult-use
marijuana legalization. Early adult-use legalization efforts were
stymied by the opposition of existing medical marijuana
dispensaries to what would amount to new competition. 188
Reformers learned to flip the interest groups’ incentives by
routinely giving existing medical marijuana dispensary licensees
priority access to adult-use dispensary licenses.189 In Washington
in 2012, medical marijuana providers organized in opposition to
the legalization of adult-use marijuana; 190 in New York in 2021, on
the other hand, medical marijuana licensees aggressively lobbied
for the right to participate in the adult-use market. 191 Local
jurisdictions are another important interest group, themselves
influenced by neighborhood organizations 192 that may be
ambivalent toward marijuana so long as dispensaries are Not In
My BackYard (“NIMBY”). Allowing local jurisdictions to opt out
of allowing local dispensaries dulls the opposition of NIMBY
neighborhood organizations. 193 Different jurisdictions may make
different decisions on opt-out due to both differing views on
marijuana and because “[i]nterest groups are not equally active in
all cities.” 194
Reform requires putting together a viable political coalition,
especially if it is to happen legislatively. Legalization has moved
from a libertarian approach that attracted weak support to a taxand-regulate approach (with a dash of social justice) that appeals
to a broad cross-section of interest groups on the American Left.
Wallach & Rauch, supra note 35, at 7.
Pace, Free Market, supra note 2, at 1255 (citing Wallach & Rauch, supra note
35, at 8).
190 Wallach & Rauch, supra note 35, at 7.
191 Ferré-Sadurní & Closson, supra note 102.
192
See Cooper, supra note 184, at 206, 211 (noting that neighborhood
organizations are an important interest group for local politics) (citing David R.
Elkins, The Structure and Context of the Urban Growth Coalition: The View from
the Chamber of Commerce, 23 POL’Y STUD. J. 583 (1995); ROBERT J. DILGER,
NEIGHBORHOOD POLITICS: RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS IN AMERICAN
GOVERNANCE (1992)).
193 Pace, Free Market, supra note 2, at 1255–56 (citations omitted).
194 Cooper et al., supra note 184, at 207.
188
189
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The addition of social equity provisions attracts the support of
minority and social justice groups. 195 Provisions designed to appeal
to labor unions sometimes appear.196 Further, potential tax
revenue from legal marijuana sales appeals to policymakers. Other
interest groups have had a perhaps surprisingly muted role. Big
Tobacco is a latent interest group that may become more active in
the future, especially if federal restrictions are eased.197 Local law
enforcement bureaus have an incentive to oppose legalization
because they “can expand their budgets through civil asset
forfeitures,” 198 but they have not been able to prevent the march of
legalization through the states. 199
Convergence is in part “time-specific.” 200 Two different
regulatory approaches could have different costs and benefits but
roughly equal out from an efficiency perspective (that is, there are
multiple optima).201 Given roughly equal efficiency, two states
195 See infra Part IIb (identifying social equity provisions as a common element
of recent, successful reform efforts); see also Wallach & Rauch, supra note 35, at 11
(noting that reformers “recruited organizations representing the interests of minority
communities, including the NAACP and the League of United Latin American
Citizens (LULAC).”).
196 See, e.g., Pace, Free Market, supra note 2, at 1271 (noting that “labor interests
in Michigan have already succeeded in inserting language in proposed marijuana
regulations that would require a labor peace agreement be in place with a union
before the state will grant a marijuana license”) (citing Michigan Marijuana Agency
Hears Mixed Reactions to Labor Peace Agreements, CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS. (Feb. 13,
2020, 7:59 AM), https://www.crainsdetroit.com/marijuana/michiganmarijuanaagency-hears-mixed-reactions-labor-peace-agreements).
197 Compare Holden & Edelman, supra note 24, at 1082 (“According to multiple
sources, the largest cigarette manufacturing companies in the world have already
begun to purchase stakes in leading marijuana startups with the hopes of gaining an
early foothold into emerging marijuana markets.”) (relying on Thor Benson, Big
Tobacco Is Already Eyeing Pot, ROLLING STONE, (Sept. 25, 2018, 3:45 PM),
https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-features/big-tobacco-pot-weedcannabis-industry-727407); Rachel A. Barry et. al., Waiting for the Opportune
Moment: The Tobacco Industry and Marijuana Legislation, MILBANK Q. 207, 209
(2014), with Pace, Free Market, supra note 2, at 1232 (arguing that the federal
prohibition of marijuana might allow dissident shareholders to block tobacco
corporations from entering the marijuana industry).
198 Bruce L. Benson et al., Police Bureaucracies, Their Incentives, and the War
on Drugs, 83 PUB. CHOICE 21, 30–31 (1995).
199 Cf. Wallach & Rauch, supra note 35, at 2 (describing law enforcement as part
of “an ‘iron triangle’ of anti-legalization interests” that slowed reform).
200 Garrett & Jansa, supra note 178, at 389 (citing Virginia Gray, Innovation in
the States: A Diffusion Study, 67 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1174, 1175 (1973)).
201 Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 23, at 156.
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deciding which approach to take might rationally choose different
approaches. “Given that moving from one [approach] to another
would involve [transition] costs, maintaining the status quo might
be efficient in each” state, preventing convergence over time. 202
Even if one approach is more efficient than the alternative,
divergence will persist if transition costs exceed potential efficiency
gains from convergence. For example, alcohol control systems
and dry jurisdictions have little effect on alcohol consumption. 203
As the policy choice appears to change behavior little, the
efficiency gains from changing policy may be small. The
divergence between dry and wet jurisdictions may also be driven
not just by different views on alcohol but by other factors such as
economies of scale for the cost of enforcing alcohol rules, further
limiting potential efficiency gains. 204
States compete with other states. 205 If one state pushes up
alcohol or marijuana prices with heavy taxes, for example,
residents near the border may choose to cross that border to buy
alcohol or marijuana in a lower-tax state, costing the state where
they reside tax revenue. Michigan and Illinois legalizing adult-use
marijuana put pressure on neighboring states whose citizens can
now much more easily travel across state lines to buy marijuana. 206
Convergence is in part a product of “the external influences of
Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 23, at 156.
Toma, supra note 60, at 508 (citing Janet Smith, An Analysis of State
Regulations Governing Liquor Store Licensees, 25 J. L. & ECON. 301, 319 (1982);
Stanley I. Ornstein, Control of Alcohol Consumption Through Price Increases, 41 J.
STUD. ON ALCOHOL 807, XX (1980); Julian L. Simon, The Economic Effects of State
Monopoly of Packaged-Liquor Retailing, 74 J. POL. ECON. 188, 193 (1966); Alan D.
Entine, The Relationship Between the Number of Sales Outlets and the
Consumption of Alcoholic Beverages in New York and Other States, STUDY PAPER
NO. 2, ALBANY: NEW YORK STATE MORELAND COMMISSION OF THE ALCOHOLIC
BEVERAGE CONTROL LAW (Oct. 1963)).
204 Toma, supra note 60, at 511.
205 See Choudhry & Hume, supra note 18, at 360 (“By engineering a competition
among regional governments for mobile people, resources and money, [federalism]
also ensures that those governments face economic and political pressure to refrain
from infringing upon property rights and markets: a result that just so happens to
enhance economic efficiency across the federal system.”) (citing Barry R. Weingast,
202
203

The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and
Economic Development, 11 J. L., ECON., & ORG. 1, 5 (1995)); see also Garrett & Jansa,
supra note 178, at 389 (“Economic competition theory suggests that states compete
with other states.”).
206 Pace, Free Market, supra note 2, at 1254–55.
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neighboring or regional states.” 207 And, indeed, U.S. marijuana
legalization has shown regional patterns.
Information also flows from state to state, and interest
groups 208 and policy entrepreneurs help facilitate that flow. 209
Time-constrained state legislators “are more likely to borrow
existing policy ideas from other political actors.” 210
State
legislators are more likely to borrow a policy approach that has
succeeded in other states.
Having borrowed policy, state
legislators can focus on tweaks to further increase the likelihood of
success.211 Those tweaks may then be borrowed in turn. Note that
the knowledge being passed is what is politically feasible and how
to build a viable political coalition for reform, not necessarily
which policy approach is most efficient. 212 This explains why U.S.
207
Garrett & Jansa, supra note 178, at 388–89 (citing Jack L. Walker, The
Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 880
(1969) [hereinafter, Walker, Diffusion of Innovations]).
208
Garrett & Jansa, supra note 178, at 388 (citing Bradley Kile, Networks,
Interest Groups, and the Diffusion of State Policy, ELECTRONIC THESES, TREATISES

DISSERTATIONS, FLA. STATE UNIV. LIBRS.
1,
45–47
(2005),
https://www.proquest.com/docview/304998009?pq-origsite=gscholar&fromopenvie
w=true); Steven J. Balla, Interstate Professional Associations and the Diffusion of
Policy Innovations, 29 AM. POL. RSCH. 221, 240–41 (2001); Haider-Markel, supra
note 178; Jack L. Walker, The Diffusion of Knowledge, Policy Communities, and
Agenda Setting: The Relationship of Knowledge and Power, in NEW STRATEGIC
PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL POLICY 75 (J.E. Tropman et al. eds. 1981); Walker, Diffusion
of Innovations, supra note 207).
209
Garrett & Jansa, supra note 178, at 392 (citing Michael Mintrom & Sandra
Vergari, Policy Networks and Innovation Diffusion: The Case of State Education
Reforms, 59 J. OF POL. 126, 144 (1998)).
210 Garrett & Jansa, supra note 178, at 392; see also Garrett & Jansa, supra note
178, at 389 (“According to [social learning] theory, state officials who want to solve
the policy problems facing their state look to and learn from other states that have
experimented with policy solutions to similar problems.”).
211 See Daniel J. Mallinson & A. Lee Hannah, Policy and Political Learning: The
Development of Medical Marijuana Policies in the States, 50 PUBLIUS: THE J. OF
FEDERALISM 344, 344 (2020) (“[P]olicy learning is not the only learning process that
occurs as a policy spreads. States also learn about the political ramifications of the
policies that they are considering and legislators further adapt them to match the
contours of local demands.” (citing Fabrizio Gilardi, Who Learns from What in Policy
Diffusion Processes?, 54 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 650, 660–61 (2010); Lawrence J.
Grossback et al., Ideology and Learning in Policy Diffusion, 32 AM. POL. RES. 1, 20
(2003); Jami K. Taylor et. al., Content and Complexity in Policy Reinvention and
Diffusion: Gay and Transgender-Inclusive Laws Against Discrimination, ST. POL. &
POL’Y Q. 12 (1), 75–98).
212
Cf. Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 23, at 160 (“There is in fact no mechanism
that ensures that political processes will only produce and retain efficient
AND
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marijuana reforms show convergence. On the other hand,
information flow was limited in creating U.S. state alcohol
regulations because each state was acting contemporaneously (the
same is true of Canadian provincial marijuana regulations). 213
Where policy is made in multiple sub-national units
contemporaneously and a conscious decision is made not to
coordinate policy at the federal level, divergence will result. Due
to path dependence and interest group politics, that divergence
will tend to persist. This is especially likely where state legislators
have “little personal expertise in the complexities of” the
regulation, as was the case with alcohol post-Prohibition in the U.S.
and marijuana post-prohibition in Canada. 214 If, on the other
hand, policy change is incremental, convergence is likely.
Convergence is likely to continue in the marijuana context.
The million-dollar question is whether, when, and how the federal
government will take a more active hand in marijuana policy. The
federal government has substantial power to influence state policy.
But Congress does not have the formal or informal power to roll
back the clock to the pre-legalization status quo. 215 Legalization
creates incentives for interest groups to fight to retain advantages
and for continued liberalization of U.S. marijuana policy. And
even if Congress decides to step in and set federal marijuana
policy, it will benefit from years of experimentation at the statelevel. 216
arrangements.”) (relying on Mancur Olson, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS:
ECONOMIC GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES 17–35 (1982)).
213
See de Koning & McArdle, supra note 14, at 364 (“Effectively, Canada
simultaneously created 13 distinct emerging economies within a mature economic
framework. Each of those 13 distinct economic models approached opening their
markets somewhat differently, but all of them did so at the same time.”). Only two
[U.S. states] allowed legal, [adult-use] sales at that time. de Koning & McArdle, supra
note 14, at 368.
214 Levine & Reinarman, supra note 37, at 477.
215 See generally Mikos, Limits of Supremacy, supra note 81.
216 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”); see also Sutton,
supra note 162, at 10–11
The era between the Declaration of Independence in 1776 and the
U.S. Constitutional Convention in 1787 was the seminal era of
constitution writing. The most inspired constitution writing in this
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CONCLUSION

Despite the potential advantages of convergence, alcohol
regulation in the U.S. continues to diverge. Marijuana regulation,
on the other hand, is converging. This distinction is not driven by
differences in sound policymaking or even cultural differences.
Rather, it is driven by an accident of timing. Because the initial
post-Prohibition alcohol regulation by states happened
contemporaneously, states chose disparate approaches, and those
idiosyncrasies were entrenched by interest group politics and path
dependence. For U.S. marijuana regulation, on the other hand,
legalization has been incremental, giving states considering
legalization the chance to learn from the experiences of prior
states. Interest group politics still apply, but in this scenario,
interest groups work as a force for convergence rather than
divergence. Convergence should be expected to continue in U.S.
marijuana regulation and is likely to affect federal regulation when
a shift finally happens at the federal level. The future of alcohol
regulation is more uncertain: the craft alcohol boom began to push
states toward convergence, but the COVID-19 pandemic may have
shifted alcohol regulation back toward divergence.

country, perhaps at any time, perhaps anywhere, occurred before
1787, and it occurred in the States. . . . Whether it’s the individual
liberty guarantees added in 1791 (the Bill of Rights), in 1865 (the
Thirteenth Amendment), in 1868 (the Fourteenth Amendment),
or in 1920 (the Nineteenth Amendment), all of the language
underlying these guarantees originated in the States.

